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Privacy Self-Regulation and the Changing Role of the State 
From Public Law to Social and Technical Mechanisms of Governance 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a structured overview of different self-governance mechanisms for 
privacy and data protection in the corporate world, with a special focus on Internet pri-
vacy. It also looks at the role of the state, and how it has related to privacy self-
governance over time. While early data protection started out as law-based regulation 
by nation-states, transnational self-governance mechanisms have become more impor-
tant due to the rise of global telecommunications and the Internet. Reach, scope, preci-
sion and enforcement of these industry codes of conduct vary a lot. The more binding 
they are, the more limited is their reach, though they – like the state-based instruments 
for privacy protection – are becoming more harmonised and global in reach nowadays. 
These “social codes” of conduct are developed by the private sector with limited par-
ticipation of official data protection commissioners, public interest groups, or interna-
tional organisations. Software tools - “technical codes” - for online privacy protection 
can give back some control over their data to individual users and customers, but only 
have limited reach and applications. The privacy-enhancing design of network infra-
structures and database architectures is still mainly developed autonomously by the 
computer and software industry. Here, we can recently find a stronger, but new role of 
the state. Instead of regulating data processors directly, governments and oversight 
agencies now focus more on the intermediaries – standards developers, large software 
companies, or industry associations. And instead of prescribing and penalising, they 
now rely more on incentive-structures like certifications or public funding for social and 
technical self-governance instruments of privacy protection. The use of technology as 
an instrument and object of regulation is thereby becoming more popular, but the suc-
cess of this approach still depends on the social codes and the underlying norms which 
technology is supposed to embed. 
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Privacy Self-Regulation and the Changing Role of the State 
From Public Law to Social and Technical Mechanisms of Governance 
PRIVACY AND REGULATION IN A GLOBAL CYBERSPACE1  
The Internet as a case of global governance 
Privacy protection is a policy field with growing importance in the information society. 
Though its foundations date back to early liberal philosophy, which drew a clear border 
between the public and private spheres of citizens’ lives2, it has been the subject of in-
tentional political regulation only since the second half of the 20th century. This devel-
opment was closely connected to the rise of computer use. The first generations of pri-
vacy and data protection laws that were enacted in Western Europe and the United 
States in the 1970s and 1980s envisaged few centralised databases that could be easily 
controlled. The rise of personal computers and widespread Internet use changed this 
picture drastically. Since then, self-regulatory approaches, like codes of conduct, con-
tracts, standards and technical means, have become more widespread, corresponding to 
the spread of the use of computers and, more recently, data networks like the Internet. 
More and more personal data can be collected, processed and transferred online. There-
fore, the Internet is empirically a good case to study recent developments in the field of 
privacy or data protection.  
The Internet should also theoretically be a most likely case to observe changes in the 
type of governance structures. As a global space for all kinds of human interaction, it 
should show the typical signs of globalised governance beyond the nation-state (spatial 
dimension). As it is mainly run by private and transnational companies, with its techni-
cal standards being developed by transnational bodies, it should also be a most likely 
case for self-regulatory forms of private governance (organisational dimension). Unlike 
telephone networks, which were designed by hierarchical forms of coordination in and 
between nation states, the Internet seemed to be immune to any form of central steer-
ing.3 Because the Internet crosses and to some extent ignores national borders4, it un-
                                                 
1  Research for this paper was conducted in the project B4, “Regulation and Legitimacy on the Internet”. I thank 
Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg, and  two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Clemens Haug, Nino 
Jordan, Dulani Perera, and Monika Tocha provided valuable research assistance. 
2  See Warren and Brandeis (1890) as a prominent example. Rössler (2001) provides a good systematisation of the 
liberal arguments for privacy. 
3  Surely, the core resources of the Internet, like the root server for the domain name system or the allocation of IP 
address ranges, are organised centrally. But normal usage is not affected by this, as routing and packet switching 
take place in a decentralised way. 
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dermines territorial forms of control (Drake 1993). In the view of many observers, this 
could only mean that cyberspace had to develop its own form of post-nation state con-
trol (Johnson/Post 1997). Consequently, the as yet young Internet community discussed 
various scenarios of “nongovernmental governance” for the net (Baer 1997) that ranged 
from Barlow’s famous “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” (Barlow 1996) 
to articles on the “virtual state” (Rosecrance 1996) that only plays a networking role and 
is not primarily based on its territory anymore. This debate did not end with the burst of 
the dot-com bubble. Some years into the new millennium, we still find academic visions 
and findings of the “peer-production of Internet governance” (John-
son/Crawford/Palfrey 2004), or the emergence of “global civil constitutions” in cyber-
space (Teubner 2003). 
No academic discussion, not less any political vision, comes without sceptics. Al-
ready early on in this debate, they raised their voices against the “cyber-separatists” (for 
the following, see Mayer-Schönberger 2003: 605-673). They viewed “reports of the 
imminent death of the state as greatly exaggerated” (Post 1998: 521), and deconstructed 
the libertarian cyber-optimism as a new “Californian ideology” (Barbrook/Cameron 
1995). There are two groups of scholars that still believe in a role of the state (Mayer-
Schönberger 2003). The “traditionalists” insist that people and corporations acting 
online are still present in the physical space, and that the Internet also depends and runs 
on a physical infrastructure comprised of cables, servers, and routers. As these are lo-
cated in national territories, they can become objects of the state monopoly of force. 
Implementation of regulation and enforcement of law on the Internet might be more 
difficult, but not impossible (for a recent empirical account in this perspective see Gold-
smith/Wu 2006). The “internationalists” are more concerned about the non-Cartesian 
characteristics of cyberspace, where physical distance is compressed to the question of 
how many hyperlinks two websites are apart, and where “safe havens” – the proverbial 
server on the Antilles – can be used for escaping regulation while still providing world-
wide services. Because of the global extension of cyberspace, the Internationalists see 
multilateral cooperation between states as necessary for functioning regulation. The 
proper medium for global governance of cyberspace therefore would be international 
law – still state-based, but with global reach (Berg 2000: 1305-1362). 
This surely sounds familiar to scholars who study the legal forms of global govern-
ance. In the offline-world, the equivalent of “cyber-separatism” is transnational self-
regulation or “Lex Mercatoria”, the realm of independent rule-making and norm-setting 
by private transnational actors, mostly specialised for different industry sectors. The 
                                                                                                                                               
4  The real borders of the Internet exist between the different transnational network providers, not between coun-
tries. 
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equivalent of “Internet traditionalism” is the legal traditionalism, which still sees real 
law as only possible within nation-states, as this is where the last resort for law en-
forcement – physical force applied through the police – is located. And “international-
ism” resembles the traditional forms of multilateral governance, where international law 
is seen as the only adequate form of reacting to interdependence and globalisation. 
To summarise: One aim of this paper is to track the relation between the state and 
self-governance, and how it has changed over the last decades. But as the next part will 
show, this analysis of changes in governance structures cannot be done by purely look-
ing at the continuum between private sector autonomy and state-based legal regulation.  
Social and technical governance structures 
There is a different dimension to the Internet in terms of rule-setting and rule-
enforcement. In the offline world (the “meat-space”, as many netizens say), norms are 
social rules. They are generated, communicated, adapted and enforced by social interac-
tions. They may have strong compliance mechanisms, and the most successful rules are 
surely the ones we have internalised and do not even recognise as such anymore. But in 
principle, they can be followed or not. Let me give an example from an offline infra-
structure that has many common characteristics with the Internet – the street system. If 
the speed limit is set to 30 kilometres per hour in residential areas, many drivers will 
accept this because they think it is reasonable, and they may themselves have children 
who play football on their own street. But a car driver in a hurry can still decide to not 
obey the law and drive faster. Rule enforcement then sometimes works locally and so-
cially, for example, if pedestrians directly show their dissatisfaction with this behaviour 
through more or less rude gestures. But it mostly works through some legal sanctioning 
mechanism: the speeding fine. If the risk - calculated from the surcharge and the 
chances of getting caught – is high enough, many drivers will restrain from speeding in 
anticipation of the consequences. But the underlying mechanism here is the risk of ex-
post sanctions. In principle, drivers are free in their individual decisions to speed or not, 
even under legal rules.  
This is different when physical or architectural constraints come into play. Imagine a 
street in a residential neighbourhood where the speed limit had been set to 30 km/h, but 
where many drivers still rush through it. This is often the case where the street is 
straight, paved, and has few bends, crossroads, or traffic-lights. In many cases, commu-
nities that do not want to bother with the high transactional costs of speeding cameras 
rely on a different mechanism. They set up speed-bumps. These make the drivers slow 
down automatically, because they do not want to damage their cars’ suspensions, or 
they are afraid of losing control over the car in speeding over the bumps. To most driv-
ers, it is plainly impossible to speed over speed-bumps. The physical characteristics of a 
street - its architecture – have a huge impact on the drivers’ behaviour. This does not 
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work through social norms and the risk of ex-post sanctions, but through the architec-
ture and ex-ante enforcement. Still, in the offline-world, speed-bumps can be ignored to 
some extend by getting very good suspension, huge tires, or – as an extreme example – 
a tank. Street traffic is based on physics, and the limitations built into the infrastructure 
can be overcome to some extent by using the laws of physics. 
The political nature of technologies and the fact that their design can influence and 
control social behaviour has been widely discussed in the “Science, Technology and 
Society” community (Bijker 1992, Winner 1986a). Structures like road bumps, bridges, 
and even the design of yard door locks (Latour 1994) can determine how people can 
move and behave. In cyberspace, architecture has an even more constraining role than 
in the offline-world. If you are connected to the Internet through a dial-up modem, you 
can have a very fast computer, but you will still not be able to have the data packets 
flow faster than 56 kilobits per second. And even if you have a high-speed connection, 
say at a university research laboratory, some websites will not respond very fast, be-
cause the servers they are running on are slow or busy, or their uplinks are congested. 
While this still very much resembles the street analogy, with fast or slow cars and 
highways or bumpy tracks, much more constraints are possible through programming 
the servers, switches and routers through which the data packets flow. A street that 
would automatically slow down all cars headed towards a particular location is unthink-
able, but in cyberspace, this is reality. The German Internet service provider Tiscali, for 
example, automatically slows down all traffic from its DSL customers that comes from 
specific ports of their computers, namely the ports used for peer-to-peer file-sharing. 
There are many more examples for this, from Chinese automated content filtering to the 
technical blocking of specific forms of Internet usage at the workplace through the 
companies’ firewalls. The Chinese government can enact a law prohibiting visits to 
critical websites (and it has done so), and companies can set social rules that discourage 
their employees from using instant messaging services in the office (and many have 
done so). But they can also build these rules into the architecture of the routers, switches 
and firewalls – and many have done so.  
The Internet is a technical infrastructure, but it is also a social space that enables, fa-
cilitates and shapes online interactions between individuals and groups. Since all of 
these interactions take place in a technically mediated environment, the range of free-
dom and individual options for behaviour is also determined by the way the network 
architecture is built. This differs from large industrial socio-technical systems, which by 
technical design impose a strong discipline on the workers5, but where the latter can still 
                                                 
5  “The automatic machinery of a big factory is much more despotic than the small capitalists who employ workers 
ever have been”, (Engels 1978: 731; quoted after Winner 1986b). 
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go on strike and leave the factory. In cyberspace, you cannot leave the data “machines” 
constituted by the operating systems and network protocols. It is these regulatory char-
acteristics of cyberspace that made Joel Reidenberg (1998) speak of a “Lex Infor-
matica” that is different from state-based law, in resemblance to the “Lex Mercatoria” 
of international private trade regulation. Lawrence Lessig (1999) in a similar way has 
called the software code – which makes the Internet and our computers run – the “law 
of cyberspace”. Very much to the point, he distinguishes “West-coast code” (Silicon-
Valley based software) from “East-coast code” (Capitol-Hill-based laws). We can dis-
tinguish different levels of rigidity for Lex Informatica. The operating systems our 
computers run on (and even more the underlying hard-wired code in the hardware) and 
the networking protocols can be compared to the constitution. They provide the funda-
ment on which other applications run, and they determine what options for user control 
(e.g. different user account settings in multi-user operating systems like Windows XP or 
Unix) and identification (e.g. dynamically or statically assigned IP numbers) are possi-
ble. The equivalent of common “laws” then are applications like office software, mail 
clients, and web browsers and servers. While the users have some choice on this level 
(and can change some settings like cookie policies), the design of web servers, websites 
and the underlying databases depends on the choice of the corporation running it.  
Software code does of course not work in a vacuum. Certainly, social and commu-
nity norms also exist on the Internet about how to behave and not to behave in different 
contexts (the so-called “netiquette”). But even some codes can still be influenced by the 
user, depending on the degree of access he or she has to the computer controlling his or 
her online behaviour. If a website filter for indecent content is running on my personal 
computer which I have root access to, I can deactivate it or change its settings. If it is 
running on my company’s web proxy server, I would have to convince the network ad-
ministrator to let me visit specific websites that would normally be blocked. If it is run 
by my internet provider, I would have to change the ISP. If it is run by a national ex-
change point or international gateway, there is normally not much I can do. What is 
even more interesting for political scientists as well as legal scholars are the compli-
cated and still emerging links between state-based law, self-regulatory norms, and the 
Lex Informatica. How are law-makers and private norm-setting bodies reacting to tech-
nological change, and how are the technical codes influenced by law and social norms?  
Applied to privacy issues, the design of websites can force users to give away more 
personal data than they would like to do – and more than they would do in the real 
world. If you want to read the New York Times online, for example, you can only do so 
after registering to their customer database and giving away information about your 
address, age, job and more. The NYT web server can then follow your “click-stream”, 
i.e. the way you move around on the site, which articles you read, which ads you click 
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and more. With “cookies” or other means, this information can even be linked to the 
databases of large marketing companies like DoubleClick that earn their revenues by 
profiling customers for other corporations. Privacy online, as should be clear now,  
therefore strongly depends on the technical design of the Internet. This chapter sets out 
to contribute to this debate with empirical findings on the role of self-regulatory norms 
for the protection of privacy on the Internet, and especially how social and technical 
codes interrelate here. Data protection (the European term) or informational privacy (the 
American term) as a subject of regulation has emerged with the broader use of com-
puters in the 1960s. As the technology has changed, so have the forms of data protection 
regulation. Data protection norms have also had an impact on the design of the techno-
logical architectures.  
Self-governance structures in the privacy field have not emerged in isolation. They 
were often a reaction to consumer demands, pressure from public interest groups, and 
the usual widely reported data-leak scandals. But the general norms of privacy protec-
tion have developed mostly in the state-based national and international governance 
structures of Western Europe and North America. In order to understand the emergence 
and growing importance of privacy self-governance, it is therefore necessary to first 
have a brief look at the history of public and law-based privacy and data protection 
regulation. Against this backdrop, we can then better understand the different self-
regulatory instruments for privacy protection that have been developed since the 1990s. 
There are a number of different social codes and technical codes in the private sector 
now, with varying degrees of scope, reach, enforcement, and control over the data for 
customers and companies. Self-governance is surely gaining in importance in the pri-
vacy field, and some of its forms can be seen as private equivalents of legal regulation. 
But the story does not end there. Self-governance mechanisms of privacy protection 
have recently become the subject of closer influence by governments and other public 
bodies again. As we will see, the state is coming back - but in a different shape.  
SETTING THE STAGE: STATE-BASED PRIVACY GOVERNANCE  
National laws and international harmonisation 
„Privacy“ has been internationally regarded as a fundamental civil liberty since the 
1940s. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) already had a paragraph on 
privacy. The 1950 Council of Europe’s Human Rights Convention included a similar 
clause, and even established a court for enforcement.6 The United States already had a 
judicial tradition of privacy protection since the 1890 seminal article by Samuel Warren 
                                                 
6  Citizens could sue their governments in case they did not translate the convention’s protections to the national 
level. 
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and later Supreme Court judge Louis Brandeis, who coined the phrase of the “right to 
be left alone“ (Warren/Brandeis 1890). 
These early privacy rules were originally intended as a protection against unreason-
able police searches of private property or against an overly intrusive press. As a result 
of World War II and the experiences with the Nazi regime7, people became more afraid 
of too much personal information in the hand of powerful government bureaucracies.8 
The use of computers for accounting and personnel management that emerged in the 
1960s transformed the policy problem of limiting the compilation, access and use of 
personal files from a purely bureaucratic task into a political-technological endeavour. 
Now, it became „informational privacy“ (the American version) and “data protection” 
(in Europe) (Schwarz/Reidenberg 1996).9 The discussion on the „Big Brother state“ was 
also growing.10 The first parliaments started to draft laws to protect personal informa-
tion against unlimited computer use. 
The world’s first data protection law was enacted in the German state of Hessen in 
1970. Shortly afterwards, Sweden (1973) and the United States (1974) followed, and 
slightly later West-Germany on the federal level (1977), Denmark, Austria, France, 
Norway and Luxembourg (all 1978) also had privacy protection laws. Until the begin-
ning of the 1980s seven countries – all in Western Europe – had enacted data protection 
laws, and in the 1980s ten more followed, among them Israel, Japan, Canada and Aus-
tralia (for a systematic four-country comparison between the USA, Germany, Sweden 
and the UK from 1960-1980, see Bennett 1992). In the 1990s, 22 more states from all 
continents followed, in the new millennium a few more.11 The reasons for this general 
spread of privacy legislation are not the topic of this paper.12 We can keep in mind that 
                                                 
7  The Netherlands had maintained comprehensive population registers since the 1930s, which were seized by the 
German government in the first three days of the occupation. The Dutch Jews as a result had the highest death 
rates in all occupied countries in Western Europe – including Germany. See Seltzer/Anderson (2001). 
8  This historical memory had a much bigger impact on European than on American privacy debates, as U.S. politi-
cal culture has always had a more sceptical view of the government, and therefore it affected the framing of the 
first data protection laws in Europe, see Bennett (1992). 
9  In the U.S., the term „fair information practices“ is also widely used. 
10  Lyon (2001) has elaborated the thesis that “privacy” only became a social value when the technologically enabled 
surveillance society was already a fact. 
11  In 2004, the annual survey done by EPIC and Privacy International lists 62 States, among them only two from 
Africa, see EPIC (2004). 
12  Bennett and Raab (2003) mention a change in public opinion, policy-learning, diffusion through epistemic com-
munities and the influence of external actors (EU, Council of Europe, OECD). 
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there were some “waves” or “generations” of data protection legislation (Mayer-
Schönberger 1998). 
The technical systems then were envisioned as centralised large computer facilities 
which were easy to control and supervise, and where the data, once entered, would stay.  
„In other words: There were huge cabinets full of digitised data where before 
there had been huge cabinets full of files, but still, it were huge cabinets.“ (Fink 
2002: 85, translation RB)  
In the 1980s, the picture had already changed significantly. The globalisation of the 
economy led to an increase in transborder data flows. On the other hand, one of the offi-
cial goals of international economic policy was (and is) free trade. Personal data, as 
soon as it was more widely available than before, also became a commodity (Weichert 
2000). An expert group in the Council of Europe as early as 1970 had already stated the 
transnational character of the computer, which in turn would create a need for interna-
tional regulatory harmonisation (Bennett 1992: 134). Because the different national data 
protection laws often had different procedural regulations for transnational data trans-
fers, even though they rested on the same set of basic principles, this could lead to diffi-
cult legal conflicts (EU-JRC 2003: 90). In the late 1970s, the Council of Europe and the 
EC Parliament started to discuss how to dispose of these trade barriers while preserving 
data protection. The objective soon became clear: International harmonisation of data 
protection was needed. The European Parliament even called for the “creation of a 
genuine common market in data-processing” (European Parliament 1979). 
Several international treaties and documents were developed in the following years 
that tried to harmonise international data protection. The most binding international 
agreement for 15 years was the Council of Europe’s 1981 „Convention for the Protec-
tion of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data“. This „influ-
ential treaty“ (Bennett and Raab 2003: 3) mandated the signatories to translate its rules 
into national law. Citizens of one party to the treaty now had the right to legally fight 
any misuse of their personal data in another country that had ratified it. The convention 
also included regulations on trans-border data flows and allowed restrictions on these if 
the data was to be transferred to a country with lower protection levels. This rule had a 
harmonising impact within Europe, especially on the second generation of data protec-
tion laws that were enacted in the 1980s. The convention was not relevant for data flows 
to third party countries who had not signed the treaty. This stayed a matter of national 
legislation. The Council of Europe subsequently adopted a number of recommendations 
for implementing the convention in specific areas that range from medical databases 
(1981) to privacy protection on the Internet (1999) (EU-JRC 2003: 120). 
The OECD developed its 1980 „Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data“ in close coordination with the Council of Europe, in 
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order to avoid further complications. The guidelines are not binding like the Council of 
Europe’s convention, and they had been preceded by fierce conflicts between the United 
States and some European governments. The Europeans perceived the very low or (for 
the private sector) non-existing level of data protection in the United States as unaccept-
able and suspected behind it an attempt to globalise the dominance of the American 
computer industry with the buzz phrase „free flow of information“. The U.S. in turn 
accused the Europeans of protectionism by means of data protection (Bennett 1992: 
136f). The guidelines themselves are only a short document listing basic fair informa-
tion practices. The OECD followed up in 1985 with another declaration on „transborder 
data flows“ that dealt with data flows within transnational corporations, trade barriers 
and related aspects of data protection, and envisioned better cooperation and harmonisa-
tion (OECD 1985). 
For a decade, the OECD stayed the only supra-regional international organisation 
that dealt with privacy and data protection. Only in 1990 did the UN General Assembly 
adopt the  voluntary „Guidelines concerning computerised data files“, which had no 
follow-up mechanism and therefore no real impact. 
The European Parliament, as was mentioned above, had adopted several resolutions 
on data protection since 1976 and urged the EC Commission to draft an EC directive for 
harmonising national legislation. The commission was rather hesitant and only asked 
the member states to join the Council of Europe’s Convention until 1982 (Bainbridge 
1996: 22). Not until the end of the 1980s, with the common European market approach-
ing fast, did the Commission react and hence presented a draft European data protection 
directive in 1990. This step was a surprise to many, as the EC was still seen as an eco-
nomic community that did not deal with human rights issues. But the Commission used 
the same argument as the EC parliamentarians, the OECD and the Council of Europe 
did: It referred to article 100a of the EC treaty and presented its move as necessary for 
the functioning of the common European market. It took five more years of negotiations 
in Brussels and the Bangemann report on “Europe and the global information society” 
(EU 1994) that made the common European information space a highest priority, before 
the directive was enacted as EC95/46 (EU 1995; see Bainbridge 1996: 23-32). 
The EU data protection directive is unanimously described as „the most influential 
international policy instrument to date“ (Bennett and Raab 2003: 5). It contains regula-
tion on the private and public sector use of personal data, applies to manual and auto-
mated data processing, has detailed rules on implementation and mandatory data protec-
tion commissioners, and creates an oversight body on the European level (the “Article 
29 Working Party”) as well as a Commission-chaired committee that can make binding 
decisions. It was supplemented in 1997 by a special directive for privacy in the elec-
tronic communications sector, which was further amended in 2002 to include latest 
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technological developments (EU 1997; EU 2002). Here, the EU tried to take into ac-
count caller-identification for telephone calls, location data for mobile phones, cookies, 
spam, and other new technological possibilities. Since the 1999 treaty of Amsterdam the 
directive also applies to data processing within the EU bureaucracy, which since then 
has had its own internal data protection commissioner.  
The brief overview of international state-based privacy regulation shows a familiar 
pattern: The more binding the regulatory instruments are, the shorter their reach is. Na-
tional data protection laws, even if harmonised through the EU directive, are still the 
most precise legal regulations, and they can also be enforced by oversight authorities 
(the public data protection commissioners) and, as a last resort, by the courts. The EU 
directive is wider in scope and still fairly detailed. It has the Commission committee and 
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party as oversight bodies, and it stipulates some 
fundamental - substantial and institutional – provisions for the national laws. But as it is 
an EU directive, specific implementation and direct compliance control over the private 
sector are still delegated to the national level, according to the subsidiarity principle. 
The Council of Europe’s Privacy Convention is wider in reach than the EU directive, as 
the organisation includes European states that are not EU members. But even though it 
is a binding international treaty, it only provides a basic set of fundamental data protec-
tion principles. It is less precise in giving institutional directions to its parties, and it has 
created no day-to-day oversight body and instead relies on the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. The OECD guidelines not only apply to Europe, but also to North America 
and the Asian developed countries. But they are completely voluntary and do not consti-
tute international law. Instead, they rely on the OECD Committee for Information, 
Computer and Communications Policy’s attempts to achieve adoption of the guidelines 
by the private sector.  The UN Guidelines are, in principle, global in reach, but they are 
neither precise nor binding, and they do not have any follow-up or implementation 
mechanism. Precision and enforcement of state-based privacy regulation are therefore 
the strongest at the national level within the EU, and they get weaker in concentric cir-
cles which are constituted by the EU, the OECD, and the United Nations. 
The Internet, Safe Harbor, and the rise of self-governance 
Thirty years after the first generation of data protection laws had been enacted, the tech-
nological developments turned out less as “Big Brother”, but more as “Little Sisters”. 
The European model of registering and overseeing few large data bases hosted in large 
computer facilities was already reaching its limits in the late 1970s, with the emergence 
of mini-computers. In the mid-1980s, when the personal computer hit the market, the 
use and processing of all kinds of data – including personal data – was finally beyond 
the reach of effective government oversight. After the advent of the Internet as a mass 
medium in the 1990s, this problem became even worse, as the trade and flow of per-
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sonal data across borders was only a matter of seconds now. The big corporations were 
still easy to control, but they also had the resources for fighting against too tight gov-
ernment controls and prohibitions. Swire and Litan (1998: 200-204) use the instructive 
metaphor of elephants and mice: Elephants are large and easy to spot, but they also have 
the ability to inflict considerable damage on their environment. The problem, though, 
are the mice – the small companies that easily re-locate, are hard to control, “and breed 
annoyingly quickly” (ibid: 201). Data protection therefore could only work if govern-
ment oversight was combined with functioning self-regulation in the private sector. This 
had been the U.S. approach all along the way since the first privacy act for control of 
government use of data had been enacted in 1974. The EU directive also reflected this 
approach, because it discontinued the mandatory registration of databases with the data 
protection supervisory authorities. Nowadays companies can appoint internal data pro-
tection commissioners (or even outsource this job to specialised service providers) and 
thereby comply with the directive and the according national laws.  
The driving force behind the move towards more self-regulatory approaches in data 
protection was therefore a change in the structure of the regulated problem. If every-
body became a potential user and collector of personal data, then top-down enforcement 
and central oversight mechanisms would not work anymore – at least this was the per-
ception. The answer was an attempt to infuse data protection ideas and their social 
agents into the private sector itself.  
The other influence beyond these technological developments was political, and 
here, transatlantisation was more important than globalisation. The negotiations over the 
OECD guidelines from 1980 had already led to heavy conflicts between the Europeans 
and the U.S. government. The conflict between American „free flow of information“ 
and European „privacy“ was barely covered in the guidelines. On one hand, the guide-
lines are totally voluntary in nature, which was intended by the U.S.; on the other hand, 
they at least set some lowest common denominator for fair information principles and 
therefore met the interests of the Europeans. 
The problem became more apparent in 1995, after the EU directive had been enacted. 
For the first time, the directive, as an international instrument, harmonised data transfers 
to third-party countries. Because of this feature, it had an impact far beyond the Euro-
pean Union, and this is why we can speak of “globalisation” here, not just “Europeani-
sation”. EU Member states are only allowed to approve data exports of personal data if 
there is an “adequate level of protection” in the recipient country. If there is no compa-
rable legislation in place, the companies wanting to export the data can do so only if this 
is based on a contract with the company that receives the data. The contract also has to 
ensure adequate protection for further re-export. This clause has created a significant 
adaptational pressure on third countries (Charlesworth, 2000). The EU later also devel-
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oped standard contract clauses for data exports (EU Commission, 2002). The EU’s ade-
quacy provisions are “the de facto rules of the road” for global data processing (Bennett 
and Raab 2003: 6). 
As there is no comprehensive data protection legislation for the private sector in the 
U.S., but binding third-party data export rules in the EU, there seems to be a dilemma: 
Either the EU Commission could have treated the United States data protection regula-
tion as “not adequate” and risked another transatlantic trade war, or it could have turned 
a blind eye on the U.S. and heavily damage the credibility of the whole directive. Even 
before the transatlantic conflict was resolved, the EU directive helped create pressure 
against the United States to raise its level of data protection for the private sector. The 
Clinton administration was afraid the EU Commission could lock American companies 
out of the large European market for e-commerce, because the lack of comprehensive 
data protection legislation in the U.S. could mean an “inadequacy” rating. Before the 
directive had to be implemented on the national levels in 1998, the U.S. government 
therefore tried to convince the EU that self-regulation worked (e.g. with a comprehen-
sive compendium, US DoC, 1997). At the same time, it also started pushing the private 
sector into seriously self-regulating data protection. Some parts of the administration, 
especially in the Federal Trade Commission, even threatened to adopt legal measures if 
self-regulation would not work quickly. Therefore, the self-regulatory instruments have 
been called „the Directive’s bastard offshoots“ (Shaffer, 1999: 433). Unexpected help 
for this came from international trade regulation. The World Trade Organisation’s 1994 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) mentions privacy, but as an exception 
from otherwise liberalised trade in services, including data services (WTO, 1994).13 By 
doing this, trade liberalisation did not curb the need for the U.S. to raise their level of 
privacy protection, and even limited their ability retaliate (Shaffer, 2000: 86).  
After long negotiations, the EU commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce 
sealed a „Safe Harbor“ agreement in July 2000 (Fink 2002; Farrell 2003; Heisenberg 
2005). It can be called “hybrid” or “interface solution” (Farrel 2002), because it is a link 
between two different regulatory approaches: The European, law-based and comprehen-
sive privacy regulation and the American, private sector-based and sectoral privacy 
regulation. Under Safe Harbor, the object of the important adequacy rating by the 
Commission is not a country anymore, but a single company. Therefore, the U.S. could 
keep its data processing industry partly unregulated, and the EU could allow data trans-
                                                 
13  “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of meas-
ures (…) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations (…) including those relating to (…) the protec-
tion of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protec-
tion of confidentiality of individual records and accounts.” (WTO 1994, article XIV). 
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fers to American companies under the condition they subjected themselves to the Safe 
Harbor principles. The mechanism is quite simple: 
“The decision by U.S. organizations to enter the safe harbor is entirely volun-
tary. Organizations that decide to participate in the safe harbor must comply 
with the safe harbor's requirements and publicly declare that they do so.” (U.S. 
DoC 2005)  
As of May 2006, 950 companies have entered the Safe Harbor (U.S. DoC 2006). The 
agreement is – naturally for a compromise – weaker than the EU regulation. There is no 
possibility for EU citizens to legally insist on getting information about what is happen-
ing to their data in the U.S., or for European data protection commissioners to inspect 
the processing companies on the other side of the Atlantic. The European Parliament 
therefore strongly resisted the agreement, but because the judgment on “adequacy” ac-
cording to the 1995 directive was delegated to the Commission, could not do much 
against it. But the agreement still comes with public oversight and enforcement, because 
it used a general clause in U.S. trade regulation. Companies that have joined Safe Har-
bor and get caught red-handed can be fined by the Federal Trade Commission for “un-
fair and deceptive trade practices”. There is also an arbitration procedure in cases of 
complaints, where the arbitrator can be chosen between private providers like TRUSTe 
or public authorities like the EU data protection commissioners. 
The regulatory regime of Safe Harbor therefore consists of several layers: The EU is 
setting the substantive data protection standards, the companies voluntarily commit to 
them, private or public bodies provide arbitration services, public enforcement is done 
by a U.S. agency, and the EU commission still has the last word and can terminate the 
whole agreement if compliance or public oversight in the U.S. are not working. Safe 
Harbor therefore can be seen as a hybrid arrangement that integrates transnational self-
regulation on the one hand, and nation-state based and intergovernmental public regula-
tion on the other hand, into a complex, layered regime.  
SELF-GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS OF PRIVACY PROTECTION 
In the Safe Harbor regime, the private sector has a much more important role than in the 
traditional European regulation model, which was mainly based on public oversight and 
inspection bodies. Under Safe Harbor, most of the oversight functions as well as the 
day-to-day supervision are done by the private sector itself. The states only set the 
minimum data protection level, and it has the means of last resort in case there are seri-
ous non-compliance problems. The process leading up to the agreement in this regard 
was a learning experience for European data protection commissioners and regulators, 
and it has greatly enhanced the acceptance for private-sector self-regulation instruments. 
In this part, I will give an overview of the different instruments that are available today. 
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As we will see, they still differ greatly in terms of precision, reach, scope, and enforce-
ment mechanisms. 
Social codes 
Internal corporate rules  
The simplest form of self-regulation is when a company publicly declares that it adheres 
to a minimum set of privacy principles. This has become quite popular on the Internet. 
A “privacy policy” is nowadays found on most corporate websites, but the idea dates 
back to the early days of transborder data flows. The OECD has repeatedly urged the 
private sector to adopt the 1980 privacy guidelines. It has even developed an online pri-
vacy-statement generator to help website providers be more transparent about what data 
they collect, how they use it, what dispute-resolution mechanisms are available and so 
on.14 According to OECD staff, this is not meant as a legal instrument, but rather as a 
means of making corporate data handlers think more closely about the mechanisms and 
organisational requirements for a sound data protection policy. Often, corporate privacy 
commitments are rather a reaction to bad publicity and a public relations operation than 
a serious attempt to change the company’s internal and external data usage. They more 
resemble indications of what the management or the customer relations department be-
lieve should happen than an internal policy for employees or a guide for binding organ-
isational practices (Bennett and Raab 2006: 154). 
More recently, companies have started to translate their privacy statement into clear 
guidelines for their employees, so-called “organisational codes”. Early examples of 
these were developed by multinational companies like American Express or Readers’ 
Digest, some of them followed as a result of customer surveys. Some global corpora-
tions have also started to adopt “binding corporate rules” for privacy protection that 
apply to all subsidiaries worldwide, no matter if their country of residence has privacy 
legislation in place or not. Prominent examples are DaimlerChrysler, General Electric or 
Siemens. They come closest to a new form of an internal corporate private law of data 
protection.  
Many companies have also now established internal oversight mechanisms for ensur-
ing compliance with the organisational privacy codes. This model goes back to early 
German data protection legislation, which from the beginning had a unique model of 
institutionalising self-regulation in the private sector. Here, companies can avoid the 
burden of registering their data banks with the public oversight bodies if they create the 
position of an independent corporate data protection commissioner. This model has 
been incorporated into the 1995 EU directive (EU 1995, recital 49) and since then has  
                                                 
14  <http://www.oecd.org/sti/privacygenerator> 
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been widely accepted all over the corporate world. These “chief privacy officers”, as 
they are mostly called now, are organised in transnational professional organisations 
such as the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), and they regu-
larly meet with the public privacy commissioners. 
Codes of conduct for business associations 
More encompassing are the codes that have been developed for whole industry sectors 
(„sectoral codes“, Bennett and Raab 2006: 155-157). A number of codes of conduct are 
now available from different industry and trade associations, mainly in the United 
States, ranging from the Direct Marketing Association to the Associated Credit Bureaus. 
These sectoral codes have become quite popular in the last few years. If they do not 
apply to a specific sector but to generic business functions like customer relations man-
agement or human resources management, they are also called “functional codes” (ibid: 
157).  
Different from organisational codes, application of and adherence to these sectoral or 
functional codes are often mandatory for members of the respective trade or business 
association. They are also offered by specialised third-party entities like auditing ser-
vices or consultancy firms. Many of these self-regulating mechanisms are giving “pri-
vacy seals” to websites that publicly declare their adherence to the specific data protec-
tion standard. The most popular ones are TRUSTe and Better Business Bureau (BBB) 
Online. Enforcement in general is not very strict, but business associations play an in-
creasing role in educating their members about privacy best practices. The inherent 
problem is that the certification providers depend on funding by their members or cus-
tomers, so tough measures against the ones who break the rules are unlikely. TRUSTe, 
for example, got under public pressure after it did not properly follow accusations 
against its member Microsoft (Boutin 2002; Richardson 2000). A study conducted in 
1999 by Forrester Research concluded that privacy seal providers become more an ad-
vocate for the industry than for consumers (EPIC 2004: 110). On the other hand, busi-
ness associations (s.o.) play an increasing role in educating their members about privacy 
best practices, through specialised seminars, training services, and newsletters. This 
form of self-regulation, therefore, resembles the “managed compliance” approach more 
than the enforcement approach.  
The purely technical environment of the Internet and the World Wide Web allows for 
new forms of oversight. TRUSTe has started to automate the compliance checks 
through a mechanism called “seeding”, whereby unique data is entered into websites, 
allowing the detection of privacy-invasive data handling by the respective web-service 
later on. Even more stringent is a programme called WebTrust, developed jointly by the 
U.S. and Canadian associations of certified public accountants. Based on the high pro-
fessional standards of the accounting profession, it is now being offered throughout 
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North America as well as in Hong Kong, Australia and a growing number of European 
Countries (Bennett and Raab 2006: 166). It can be expected that these professional ef-
forts, combined with public pressure from consumer groups and privacy advocates, will 
serve as a strong incentive for self-regulatory bodies to strengthen their privacy compli-
ance and control mechanisms. 
The main problems of these self-regulatory mechanisms lie elsewhere. First, they 
only certify the adherence to a minimal set of fair information practice principles. These 
are often less privacy supportive than comparable EU legislation, e.g. with opt-out in-
stead of opt-in mechanisms for commercial marketing as the norm. Second, the seal 
providers also cannot do anything against companies that are not participating in these 
voluntary agreements. In July 2006, only 694 websites participated in the BBBOnline 
privacy programme (BBBOnline 2006), and in 2005, 1975 sites had been certified by 
the TRUSTe seal (TRUSTe 2006). 
Mandatory membership in professional associations can therefore be a strong support 
for self-regulatory privacy protection instruments. A very strong version of privacy 
codes of conduct are “professional codes” (Bennett and Raab 2006: 14). They apply to 
professional associations and have a direct influence on their individual members, not 
on companies. Well-known examples are the age-old codes for physicians or lawyers, 
who are bound to professional discretion in the relationships with their patients or cli-
ents. As the membership in these professional organisations like medical associations or 
the bar is mandatory for conducting the respective profession, misconduct can lead to 
exclusion and a loss of the professional license. 
Codes of conduct have become a standard instrument of privacy governance by now, 
and their mechanisms for compliance and certification have strengthened. Most of them 
have emerged in the United States, as their prime users are American companies, but 
due to the transnational nature of many businesses, they have been constantly growing 
in their spatial reach. Some of these efforts are now being developed on a global scale, 
the most prominent being the Global Business Dialogue on electronic Commerce’s 
guidelines for „consumer confidence“ (GBDe 2001) and the International Commerce 
Exchange on a “Global Code of Conduct”. Other global efforts in this direction have 
started in the International Air Traffic Association and the Federations of Direct Mar-
keters (Bennett and Raab 2006: 156). Typically, these transnational codes of conduct 
have been developed in close contact with the international community of data protec-
tion commissioners, and some even with active participation by privacy advocacy 
groups. TRUSTe was even founded as a joint effort of the Boston Consulting Group and 
the Californian NGO Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). But this is not a typical 
example, as the cooperation between corporate entities, NGOs and public commission-
ers is normally much less institutionalised and formalised. Instead of the highly formal-
- 16 - 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 59) 
ised forms of business-NGO-cooperation found in other industry sectors, the field of 
privacy policy is still dominated by a loose diffusion of ideas through constant and de-
centralised discussions within an epistemic community that comprises public commis-
sioners, privacy advocates, and corporate chief privacy or chief technology officers. 
Contractual solutions in business networks 
Contracts are often used as a case-by-case substitute for missing privacy legislation. 
They are common in big corporations who hold large amounts of personal data about 
customers and employees and contract out some of the work related to these. The busi-
ness agreement then has sections that regulate how the contractor can use the data, who 
holds property to it, if and how it can be transferred to third parties etc. Specific privacy 
contracts have been used since the late 1970s for allowing transborder data flows under 
national data protection laws. In France, the use of private contracts has been quite 
popular early on, but other European states have also relied on contractually ensuring 
that personal data exported to other countries is handled according to the legislation in 
the country of origin. The national data protection authorities have played a crucial role 
in pushing for the use of this instrument (Ellger 1996). 
As early as 1992 the Council of Europe developed a model contract for transborder 
data flows with the cooperation of the EU commission and the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Some other groups like the “Düsseldorfer Kreis” of German data protection 
commissioners have also been active in this area (Ellger 1996). The EU followed this 
path with the adoption of its data protection directive in 1995, which accepts standard 
contractual clauses to ensure an adequate level of protection for transborder data flows 
to third countries. These standard clauses must be verified or developed by the EU 
Commission, which has updated them several times. 
There are several limitations to this approach. First of all, what follows from the fact 
that the affected party – the citizen, customer, or user – is not subject to the contract? 
This might not be a problem in the continental European tradition, but the Anglo-Saxon 
common law countries do not have the concept of third party rights derived from a con-
tract between two other parties. Therefore, the legal enforcement of these contract 
clauses is difficult.15 Enforcement of contract clauses depends not only on the legisla-
tion (i.e. the country) chosen as the basis, but also on the national laws in the import 
country and on the interests of the receiving party. Specific laws (e.g. for intelligence 
agencies) might override strong protections in private contracts.  
On the other hand, these contracts are even used to raise the data protection level 
within a country. If companies want to ensure their contractors adhere to high data pro-
                                                 
15  The United States have given up the strict use of the privity-of-contract doctrine and allow third party beneficiar-
ies in private contracts (Ellger 1996: 765). 
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tection standards, they can insist on incorporating EU-certified standard data protection 
clauses into the business agreement. Also, government agencies with their huge pur-
chasing power have used this as leverage where mandatory data protection laws are 
lacking.  
This private data protection law of contracts has proven to be a useful instrument es-
pecially to extend the European Union’s data protection standards to countries where 
national legislation is lacking or not deemed adequate. Thereby, the use of EU data pro-
tection standard is slowly being incorporated into private sector data usage all over the 
world. This shows how private law can help spreading a regional legal standard through 
the use of mandatory data export control clauses (Reidenberg 1999). 
Standards 
Privacy standards go further than commitments of voluntary codes of conduct, because 
they provide a set of objective criteria and at the same time a defined process by which 
compliance can be tested. Standards here do not mean technical standards or networking 
protocols, but a standardised way of measuring the performance of how technology and 
social practice are integrated into an organisation. There has been some discussion 
about general privacy standards linked to the generic quality management standards of 
the ISO 9000 series. Standards normally also have strict oversight and compliance 
mechanisms that go further than voluntary codes and are more comparable to profes-
sional codes.  
The first real privacy standard was the Canadian „Model Code for the Protection of 
Personal Information“. It had been developed since 1992 by trade associations and con-
sumer organisations together with the Canadian government and the Canadian Stan-
dards Association (CSA). The objective was to harmonise the different self-regulatory 
codes, but it was also a reflection of the failed attempts of the OECD in this field. The 
model code was officially recognised as a „National Standard of Canada“ in 1996. Or-
ganisations that voluntarily adopt the standard are then bound to mandatory quality con-
trols by the CSA. Standards similar to the Canadian Model Code have also been devel-
oped elsewhere. The Japanese Standards Association in 1999 published the standard JIS 
Q 15001 (“Requirements for Compliance Program on Personal Information Protec-
tion”), which is modelled in detail after the structure of the environmental management 
standard ISO 14001 (Bennett 2004a: 234). JIS Q 15001 was developed out of a gov-
ernment-issued norm, the 1997 Data Protection Guidelines from the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) (Privacymark.org 2006). The Australian Privacy 
Commissioner in 1998 published “National Privacy Principles” that resemble the Cana-
dian model (Bennett 2004a: 234).  
On the international level, the Council of the International Standards Organisation 
(ISO) in 1996 initiated a process for the development of an international privacy stan-
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dard after pressure from ISO’s Consumer Policy Committee. Because of heavy lobby-
ing from U.S. corporations and criticism from European data protection commissioners, 
ISO has not yet been able to agree on a standard. The European standards body Comité 
Européen de Normalisation (CEN) has also been studying the feasibility of an interna-
tional privacy standard. CEN works together with the EU’s data protection commis-
sioners (Bennett 2004a: 236).  
Comparison 
While national privacy standards have been successful in a few cases, an agreement on 
a global privacy standard has proven to be very difficult. On the other hand, privacy 
codes of conduct within single corporations are very binding and detailed. Sectoral 
codes and global industry guidelines still tend to be more lists of general principles 
rather than specific routines. Those codes of conduct that have institutionalised compli-
ance mechanisms are somewhat in the middle. Theoretically, they apply to a large num-
ber of corporations across the globe, but practically, these still have to subscribe to them 
(and pay for them) individually. Contractual solutions only apply to the trading partners 
that include them in their business agreements, and they are mostly used by EU-based 
corporations that want to transfer data to third countries. As there are no highly inte-
grated “supply chains” for personal data, the network of contractual privacy protections 
is still rather loose, and it does not have a broad trickle-down effect like e.g. product 
standards do in the car manufacturing sector. The most binding forms of privacy self-
regulation are still the very old professional codes for lawyers, physicians, and priests. 
Here, compliance is to a large extent self-enforcing, because customer confidence in the 
secrecy of their information is at the core of the business model. Additionally, non-
compliance can also mean loosing the licence to practice the profession any longer.  
This resembles what we found above about the state-based privacy regulation efforts: 
There is a trade-off between reach on the one hand, and precision and enforcement on 
the other hand. At first sight the same pattern seems to apply to privacy self-regulation. 
The more detailed the privacy codes are in terms of regulating data use (limited scope), 
the less likely they have a wide applicability (global reach). But whereas state-based 
regulation differs along territorial or regional borders (nation, Europe, OECD), private 
self-regulatory instruments apply to organisations or sectors and to a growing extent 
ignore geography. While DaimlerChrysler’s internal binding rules for privacy only ap-
ply to the corporations’ employees and data subcontractors, they are valid and enforce-
able all over the world, from Stuttgart and Detroit to Johannesburg or Mumbai. The 
IATA privacy code of conduct applies to all air carriers that are members of this organi-
sation, just like the confessional secret is binding to priests of the Catholic Church all 
over the world. The “death of distance” through the Internet as well as the general grow-
ing integration of the global economy have also made privacy self-governance instru-
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ments grow out of their territorial origins and see worldwide adoption. The privacy 
seals for websites that are provided by companies like TRUSTe or BBBOnline, while 
they were a purely U.S.-based reaction to the EU directive and the transatlantic Safe 
Harbor agreement, are now also available for and used by companies in the Far East. 
The Japanese Information Processing Development Centre (JIPDEC) in 2000 entered 
into a mutual privacy seal recognition programme with BBBOnline (Bennett and Raab 
2006: 167). Standard contract clauses for business-to-business data transfers first 
emerged in the EU, in order to make data exports possible to countries that lack ade-
quate legislation. But they have been developed in close cooperation with the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, which now recommends their use to corporations all over 
the globe.  
As the futile efforts for a global privacy standard show, a homogenous regime for the 
self-governance of privacy is not in sight. While there is a global consensus on basic 
principles (more or less already based on the 1980 OECD guidelines), the instruments 
differ in scope, reach, precision, and enforcement mechanisms. But they are gradually 
making their way through the global network of private business governance structures, 
and they are becoming more and more interlinked with each other. More recently, they 
have also found their implementation in the form of technical codes. 
Technical codes 
The regulatory efforts for privacy protection of the 1970s were already attempts by the 
states to more or less directly regulate the technology. The first data-protection laws 
were a response to electronic data banks run by governments and large corporations 
(Mayer-Schönberger 1998). The computer was the problem, and the privacy laws of the 
first generation therefore aimed at the technical systems that stored and processed data. 
They set up registration or even licensing mechanisms for databases, they regulated 
access controls, and they were full of terms like “data”, “data file” or “data record”. In 
some countries like Sweden, the public oversight agency had the power to direct spe-
cific design changes for data banks, access controls, data transfers, and the like. When 
international harmonisation started in the Council of Europe, the OECD, and later the 
EU and transatlantic agreements, privacy governance instruments lost their technologi-
cal focus and concentrated on the normative principles and institutional mechanisms. 
Only with the emergence of the Internet, the privacy implications of technological de-
sign gained wide attention again. In this case, though, the development towards privacy-
friendly technologies did neither start among governments nor corporations, but because 
of user concerns and demands.  
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User self-help tools 
The ubiquitisation of data processing converged with another development that had also 
started in the 1980s - the new legal and political concept of “informational self-
determination” that the German constitutional court had developed in a landmark census 
ruling in 1983 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1983). Contrary to the first generation of data 
protection laws that tried to regulate the corporations, the new laws and amendments, 
and the developing case law in the 1980s gave the citizens a say in the process. Their 
consent – at least in Europe – became a precondition for the use and processing of per-
sonal data. “Informational self-determination” also reached further than just the collec-
tion of the data and included the control of the individual over all later stages of the 
processing and use of the data (Mayer-Schönberger 1998). 
This development got a new boost with the Internet. In the beginning cyberspace was 
seen as a great place for user empowerment. Until the mid-1990s, most of the netizens 
did not want a role of the government in the new final frontier land. John Perry Bar-
low’s “declaration of the independence of cyberspace” (Barlow 1996) is a famous ex-
ample of the high expectations people had for the power of cyber self-regulation with-
out government involvement. This “Californian Ideology” (Barbrook and Cameron 
1995) was mirrored in the Clinton administration’s policy towards the new medium. A 
majority in Washington and elsewhere was strictly against disturbing the growth dy-
namic of the “new economy” by government interventions or regulations. “Government 
has largely taken a hands-off approach to the new economy”, as the report “State of the 
Internet” concluded even as late as 2000 (United States Internet Council 2000: 29). 
The reaction in Europe was more sceptical, but also relied very much on the users. 
The Council of Europe issued a set of recommendations for privacy on the Internet in 
1999, following up on its 1980 convention. The wording reads like a capitulation of 
state regulation:  
“For Users: Remember that the Internet is not secure. However, different means 
exist and are being developed enabling you to improve the protection of your 
data. Therefore, use all available means to protect your data and communica-
tions.” (Council of Europe 1999)  
Technology has been – and for many still is – the best and only choice for users to en-
sure their privacy online. A number of privacy-enhancing end-user tools have developed 
in the last ten years. As personal computers became easier to use with graphical user 
interfaces like Windows, MacOS, and several Linux desktop managers, privacy-
enhancing technologies were also developed from cryptic command-line tools into user-
friendly packages. Because of the Internet, they are also accessible to anyone today. 
Many of them are available for free distribution, and some of them work directly online. 
The first wide-spread tool for encrypting data on personal computers was Phil Zim-
- 21 - 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 59) 
merman’s “Pretty Good Privacy” (PGP), which sparked a lot of attention and after a 6-
years legal and political struggle in the U.S. in 1999 led to a liberalisation of export con-
trol restrictions on cryptography technology (Bendrath 2001).  
The tools available nowadays include strong encryption software for data, emails, 
and web access; web anonymising proxies; tools that automatically delete cookies; 
anonymous re-mailers; blocking software for advertisement banners and pop-up win-
dows; disposable email-addresses and even databases with fictional individual data sets 
to anonymously use websites that require registration; traffic scrambling networks; and  
furthermore.16 They generally offer two kinds of privacy protection. Most of the encryp-
tion and traffic scrambling tools help their users hide data, internet traffic patterns, and 
the traffic’s content from prying eyes, be they law enforcement agencies or network 
providers. They therefore allow online interactions between trusted parties, be they 
friends, business partners, or political activists. The threat scenario for their users is still 
more or less based on the “Big Brother” image, and this has also become popular 
through movies such as “Enemy of the State” as through widely reported snooping ac-
tivities by intelligence agencies like the NSA. The other group of privacy-enhancing 
tools is directed against corporate data collectors who track the visitors of their websites 
and online services. They include tools that allow deleting corporate tracing instruments 
like cookies and “web bugs” on the hard drives of the users computers’, as well as 
online services that provide disposable identities to anonymously access registration-
based online services.  
These privacy-enhancing tools give the users considerable protection. Many of them 
are still not widely used, but some functions like the automatic cookie-deletion have 
been included in newer versions of most web browsers and therefore have become 
mainstreamed into most computer desktops.  
Negotiation-based codes 
There is one problem that all these privacy-enhancing tools listed above cannot address: 
If the user is doing an online purchase, he or she has to enter the real name, credit card 
number and more information into a corporate website. In case the item bought is not a 
digital good like a music file, the company also needs the address and more information 
for the delivery. How can the users be sure this information is not being misused after-
wards? This is where negotiation-based technical codes come into play, which act like 
an agent between the user and the companies. The user can use tools that automatically 
negotiate his privacy preferences with the website he or she visits. A well-known exam-
ple for this is the P3P standard („Platform for Privacy Preferences Project“) for web-
sites. It was developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) with the inclusion 
                                                 
16  For an overview, see <http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html>. 
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of corporations, technology experts, and data protection commissioners (Cranor 2002). 
P3P presumes no set level of privacy protection, but enables the user to define his pri-
vacy “choices” for different types of websites. The concrete data transactions are then 
automatically negotiated between the user’s web browser and the company’s web 
server. The standard has been applauded by public data protection commissioners as a 
model for technological enforcement of privacy protection mandated by law. The Euro-
pean Commission is also following this approach. In 2003, it stated that technological 
measures “should be an integral part in any efforts to achieve a sufficient level of pri-
vacy protection.” (EU Commission 2003: 16)  
On the other hand, privacy advocates have criticised P3P as just being an automation 
of the data collection that many websites do anyway. The standard development process 
for P3P even started under the name „Open Profiling Standard“ (Article 29 Working 
Party 1998). An assessment by the Electronic Privacy Information Centre mentioned the 
lack of enforcement options, because “P3P provides no means to ensure enforcement of 
the stated privacy policies” (EPIC 2000). About ten per cent of all major websites 
nowadays have some P3P functionality (Byers et al 2003), and most web browsers sup-
port P3P. Before the standard was adopted, the EU’s data protection commissioners   
had already asked that the default settings in the browsers should reflect the highest 
level of protection (Article 29 Working Party 1998). This was not the case, and with the 
Internet becoming a mass medium, the average user is even less familiar with these 
technological solutions or with how to set the personal privacy preferences in the 
browsers.  
Privacy and identity infrastructures  
These technological approaches are currently being developed into more comprehensive 
infrastructures under the label „Privacy and Identity Management” (PIM). They are ex-
pected to provide two features at the same time: A simple and user-friendly administra-
tion of his or her online identity, and a technological implementation of data protection 
standards. Most PIM concepts include some kind of single-sign on service that makes 
the handling of different logins and passwords for several websites and online services 
easier for its users.  
It is not yet clear if in the end this will lead to better data protection or even to the 
end of anonymity on the net. Microsoft’s heavily criticised „Passport“ / „.Net“ pro-
grammes with central databases are regarded PIMs, as are decentralised online infra-
structures that ensure far-reaching anonymity and pseudonymity (so-called “federated” 
PIMs). Sophisticated designs include public-key encryption schemes that would allow 
the individual to not only control the delivery of his or her personal data to corporations 
and other users, but the use of this data after it has been submitted (for an overview, see 
ICPP 2003). Complementary to the P3P front-end standard that allows the user to con-
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trol which data he gives to websites, meta-data protocols are currently being developed 
to ensure that once personal data has entered the corporate data warehouses (back-end), 
its processing can only be done according to the preferences of the person it belongs to. 
The Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Language (EPAL), such a privacy meta-data stan-
dard, is already in use at companies like eBay. Like P3P, the EPAL standard was sub-
mitted for adoption to the World Wide Web Consortium, and like P3P, it has been de-
veloped by industry (IBM Laboratories Zürich) in cooperation with data protection 
commissioners (Borchers 2004). 
Recently, a lively debate has started online and at a number of meetings and confer-
ences about “user-centric identity management”. It has actively been driven by Micro-
soft’s privacy and identity staff, which - after the market failure of “Passport” – seems 
to have understood that a single customer database controlled by a monopoly-like cor-
poration is neither what users are looking for, nor what companies want as an interme-
diary for their customer relations. The basic idea for the design of this new identity 
management architecture is the use of credentials. This would allow only transferring 
the minimal amount of personal data needed. To use an example from the streets again: 
If stopped by the police on a highway, drivers would only prove the fact that they have 
a driving license (legal driver credential), not their names, addresses or other personal 
information which is not relevant in that specific context. Most of the participants in 
these developments towards identity management are from large, U.S.-based informa-
tion technology corporations, with a few academics and freelance consultants also tak-
ing part. Privacy advocates as well as public data protection commissioners are largely 
missing.17
The development of these infrastructural concepts is still in an early phase, and a 
broad user-base is still lacking. But if successful, the technical design of the systems 
will have a broad impact on how anonymously people can move on the Internet in the 
future. Thinking of the famous cartoon “on the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog” 
(Steiner 1993), companies now might not always have to know that there is a dog, but 
would ask for the dog’s age, gender, credit card number, or other information depending 
on the service provided. The technical differences between the several emerging identity 
management standards can be overcome through interfaces and gateways, but the dif-
ferent levels of data protection incorporated within them are more difficult to harmonise 
(Farber 2003). Therefore, EPAL allows for the creation of templates through which the 
different legal data protection provisions in different countries can be implemented 
(Borchers 2004). 
                                                 
17  A central hub for this development is a loose network called the “Identity Gang”, <http://www.identitygang.org>. 
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Comparison 
Like in the realm of social codes for privacy self-governance, there is no single techni-
cal standard for privacy protection on a global scale. This is partly due to the different 
threats to privacy, which need different tools for protection. On the other hand, it also 
reflects the different interests and needs of corporate data processing and the respective 
policies and technical architectures. In the technical field, we can again observe a trade-
off between the reach of the technical codes and the privacy protection they provide. 
But different from the social codes, the individuals do not necessarily depend on private 
corporations and their privacy codes of conduct. Instead, their level of control over their 
own data as well as the variety of tools available for protecting it varies with the archi-
tectural scope of the technical codes. For users who individually want to hide their data 
while surfing the web or sending emails, there is a whole range of tools available that 
allows for more or less perfect protection. Still, it depends on the computer literacy and 
the personal privacy preferences if and how intensively people use these tools, and 
many of them use different combinations of them.  
For exchanging private information with other parties, there are still a number of dif-
ferent privacy tools available, but because of interoperability needs, there are only a few 
standards that are widely adopted. These also still have a growing user-base, because of 
the network effects: The more users a communications standard has, the more it will 
attract new users. This is especially true for tools that aim at protecting the communica-
tions privacy or at exchanging encrypted data between trusted parties. Pretty Good Pri-
vacy (PGP) has become the de-facto standard for private data security with this mecha-
nism, with the OpenPGP standard having been submitted to the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF 1998) and providing the basis for many other implementations (Ben-
drath 2001). Here, if the parties to a communication use the same standard, they can still 
be considerably sure that their personal information and communication is protected.  
Internet users who have to give some personal data to website providers because of a 
business relationship can use the Platform for Privacy Preferences’ web standard P3P to 
automatically negotiate their privacy preferences with the respective corporation. But 
user control has its limits here, because only a minority of websites support P3P, and 
even if they do, there are no technical measures available yet that let the individuals 
control what happens to their information once it has entered the corporate data ware-
houses. Comprehensive and strong user-centric privacy and identity management archi-
tectures are still under development, and technical back-office privacy standards like 
EPAL that limit data use within the corporate data warehouse only provide a generic 
framework. The level of privacy protection they implement depends on the social codes 
that apply to the respective company, be they self-governance codes of conduct or legal 
obligations. This lack of technically supported users’ control over their personal data 
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once they have given it to private corporations, combined with ongoing compliance 
problems in the private sector and constant consumer mistrust into e-commerce, have 
fuelled new state-based regulation efforts in recent years. 
COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS AND THE NEW ROLE OF THE STATE 
Ongoing low compliance 
In 1997, the OECD Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy 
conducted a survey of websites that openly questioned the effectiveness of any of the 
official mechanisms like the OECD privacy guidelines or national privacy legislation. 
The researchers found  
“a marked discrepancy between the world of the various institutions and organi-
sations that develop ideas and instruments for data protection on the one hand, 
and the world of Web sites on the other.“ (OECD 1998a: 23)  
Around the same time, some well-published cases of misuse of personal information by 
companies like online marketing giant DoubleClick, the steady rise of spam and junk 
mail, security holes in customer databases, and a growing fear of credit card data being 
stolen on the net (for an overview, see Junkbusters 2005) led to a public demand for 
more effective privacy protection online. The users, according to a number of other sur-
veys, are not satisfied with the state of online data protection (for an overview: Bennett, 
2004b). In March 2004, a EuroBarometer survey found that of  the  84% of EU citizens 
who do not shop online, 25% of them do not trust the medium (EuroBarometer 2004). 
This was noted by many. A number of governments and international organisations 
tried to work on online privacy under a general “trust” framework. Missing consumers’ 
trust in privacy and other rights on the web were and still are perceived as major prob-
lems that stand in the way of a large-scale breakthrough of e-Commerce. This was 
stated repeatedly from 1997 to 2003 in a number of national and international forums, 
from the White House to the EU, the OECD, and the World Summit on the Information 
Society.18
Two approaches can be distinguished that have become more popular in the last few 
years. States have been trying to directly or indirectly influence the development of 
technical codes for privacy protection, and they have started public auditing and certifi-
cation programmes for social codes of privacy self-governance. The most recent devel-
                                                 
18  See e.g. the the EU Commission’s 1997 “European Initiative in Electronic Commerce” (EU Commission 1997), 
the White House’s 1997 “Framework For Global Electronic Commerce” (White House 1997), the OECD 1997 
Turku conference on “Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce” (OECD 1998b), the OECD 
1998 Ottawa ministerial conference on “Realising the Potential of Global Electronic Commerce” (OECD 1998c), 
the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society’s “Declaration of Principles” (WSIS 2003). 
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opment, adding to these two, is the return of the traditional state-centrist model of regu-
lation: A public demand for legislation in the absence of meaningful private sector regu-
lation can now be heard louder. 
The state’s seal on social codes 
The “adequacy” rating for the privacy protection level in third countries by the EU 
Commission in a way equals the job of rating agencies in the financial sector. Elsewhere 
in the data protection universe, states have also started to certify private instruments like 
privacy standards, organisational procedures, or private contractual arrangements. The 
Canadian „Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information“, for example, is a 
model in a twofold sense: A model for good privacy practices, and a model for the 
creeping-in of a more prominent role of the state. The code had been developed since 
1992 by trade associations and consumer organisations together with the Canadian gov-
ernment and the Canadian Standards Association (CSA). It was officially recognised 
(“rated”) as a „National Standard of Canada“ in 1996. Organisations that voluntarily 
adopt the standard are then bound to mandatory quality controls by the CSA, compara-
ble to the web privacy seals in the United States. The model code even served as the 
basis for comprehensive privacy legislation for the private sector – the 2001 Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) (Bennett and Raab 
2006: 162). Under PIPEDA, audits of corporate data handling in turn can be delegated 
from privacy commissioners to accounting firms or standards certification bodies (ibid: 
138).  
The 1995 EU directive also contains options for the certification of private self-
governance instruments by public authorities. They had been conceived as exceptions 
that should be rarely used, but after the Safe Harbor breakthrough even the European 
data protection commissioners have actively supported and promoted them. The basic 
idea is to let business associations develop privacy codes of conduct, but to embed them 
in a legal framework and have them certified by public authorities. The data protection 
commissioners have a strong role here. Several adoptions of this certified self-
regulation have been developed on the national level. Under the reformed German Fed-
eral Data Protection Law of 2001, trade associations can submit their codes of conduct 
to the data protection authorities, which check these against compliance with data pro-
tection law. These decisions are not binding, though, and therefore the individual data 
processors (corporations, website owners, other entities) can submit their individual 
products or privacy policies to an audit mechanism and thereby get an official certificate 
and a seal of approval. This is also regulated in the Data Protection Law and in the new 
Media-Services Treaty between the federal states of Germany (Berlin Data Protection 
Commissioner 2001; Rossnagel 2000). The German federal state of Schleswig-Holstein 
has been offering such an audit mechanism since the year 2001, with the Data Protec-
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tion Commissioner’s independent centre as the official public certification authority. 
Interest among corporations for this official auditing is high, which shows a greater trust 
in the state’s legitimising function even in the private sector. Ironically, what is still 
missing is a federal law that regulates the exact auditing process, including certification 
and selection of the official experts supposed to do the auditing (Sietmann, 2004). A 
similar movement can be observed in Australia, where the standard principles have been 
incorporated into national law in 2001. The Privacy Act allows organisations and indus-
tries to have and to enforce their own privacy codes in order to allow for some flexibil-
ity of the application of the privacy law. The codes developed by the different industry 
associations then have to be certified by the national privacy commissioner (Australian 
Privacy Commissioner, 2005b).  
Some public certification schemes even work with additional incentives. One method 
is minimising the risk of lawsuits. In the United States, the 1998 Children’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act also introduced the possibility of an official certification of private 
privacy programmes by the FTC. Companies which receive this certificate significantly 
reduce the risk of liability lawsuits in case problems still occur. Because it fits into the 
American model of privacy protection through the courts, it could become a model for 
other areas of privacy protection as well (Cranor/Reidenberg 2002: 19). It also goes 
along with the general trend among U.S. companies to focus on formalised compliance 
methods with legal obligations in order to minimise risks that has made some people 
speak about the emergence of an “audit society” (Power 2002). Another model is reduc-
ing the bureaucratic task of getting a new privacy certificate for each jurisdiction a 
company wants to do business in. The EU directive envisions consultations between 
privacy commissioners and business associations on the national level for country-wide 
codes of conduct, and an examination by the group of national commissioners (the “Ar-
ticle 29 Working Party”) for EU-wide regulation. The European Union has recently 
started using this model of regulated self-regulation in order to certify the global adher-
ence of its data protection standards within multinational corporations. The procedure 
for this has already been harmonised among the EU data protection commissioners (Ar-
ticle 29 Working Party 2005), thereby providing a one-stop certification mechanism for 
the whole EU. In May 2005, DaimlerChrysler became the first corporation that was 
awarded a certificate which is valid in the whole EU for its global Privacy Code of 
Conduct from the French supervisory agency CNIL. Others like General Electric have 
been following them. The EU Commission, in its first report on the implementation of 
the 1995 Data Protection Directive in 2003, noted that “certification schemes play a 
crucial role“ (EU Commission 2003: 16). 
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The state’s impact on technical codes 
Some states have begun to mandate so called “privacy impact assessments” (PIAs) for 
government databases. The first country to make PIAs mandatory for federal agencies 
and departments in the early stages of system development was Canada (EU Commis-
sion, 2003: 16). In the United States, with the “E-Government Act” of 2002, every fed-
eral agency has to do a PIA before it can develop or introduce new information systems 
that use personally identifiable data. The PIAs have to be published, and oversight is 
provided by the Office of Management and Budget. The P3P standard for websites is 
also mandated by the abovementioned E-Government Act, as are privacy notices on all 
government websites. These privacy notices have to include: which information is col-
lected, why it is collected, with whom the information is shared, which „notice“ is 
available to the individual, and how the information is secured (Privacy-Times, 2 De-
cember 2002). The U.S. government will certainly help to spread the broader use of P3P 
with the E-Government Act. Government use of these technological systems, standards 
and protocols of data protection is of course not regulation of the private sector, but it 
will help to spread adoption of them beyond the public sector. The large number of 
computers the government can leverage can create the critical mass for the widespread 
adoption through network externalities, and the use by public authorities also functions 
like a certificate of quality.  
Another approach for government agencies is to actively participate in and support 
the development of privacy-enhancing technologies. As mentioned above, public data 
protection authorities and commissioners are regularly participating in industry expert 
groups that design technical codes for privacy protection like P3P and EPAL. The 
European Union has also funded a large part of the P3P development and has supported 
several privacy and identity management projects within its 6th framework research 
programme.19 The German Federal Ministry of Economics has financed the GNU Pri-
vacy Guard – a free software implementation of the OpenPGP standard for encryption. 
Other governments have done extensive studies of privacy enhancing technologies to 
further the debate and the exchange of knowledge (see Borking/Hes 2000 as a promi-
nent example).  
In a few cases, state-based governance structures have intervened directly in the 
technological design of computer systems sold by private corporations. Microsoft’s 
“Passport” programme is such an example of how the European Union now has an im-
pact on global technical developments – and thereby on global data protection compli-
ance. In its original architecture, Microsoft planned for the centralisation of all data col-
                                                 
19  PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe), FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society), 
and RAPID (Roadmap for Advanced Research in Privacy and Identity Management). 
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lected from visitors to its affiliates’ websites in order to provide authentication services 
for the latter. Microsoft, however, gave up this plan following privacy complaints from 
consumer groups and pressure from EU data protection commissioners. (EPIC 2004: 
131) Another example is search engine giant Google’s free email service “GMail”, 
which automatically scans all mails of its users and then places context-sensitive adver-
tisements within them. After strong protests from a number of privacy NGOs and an 
official complaint with several European data protection authorities by Privacy Interna-
tional, the EU group of data protection commissioners stated that Google’s service 
might violate the European data protection directive (Links & Law 2004). Google had 
to ensure that mail scanning is only done by machines and after an explicit agreement 
by the users. While the EU data protection bodies only threatened to start legal action 
against Microsoft and Google in these cases, and later entered into discussions with the 
companies, the California State Senate even adopted a bill restricting Google’s search 
and transfer abilities of GMail users’ data (Hansen 2004). 
The state, it seems, is again starting to focus on the technological design of the com-
puter and the networks and relying less purely on the users’ self-help or industry self-
regulation. But instead of regulating individual data banks and data centres like in the 
1970s, it is concentrating on technical infrastructures and standards that will have a 
widespread impact on the use of personal data.  
The return of legal enforcement 
The call for government regulation over private sector privacy policies and behaviour 
has been constantly growing in the past few years. Beth Givens, director of the privacy 
rights clearinghouse, concluded a comment on the 1999 Georgetown privacy survey 
with a recommendation that the Federal Trade Commission should “exert a stronger 
leadership role in evaluating the adequacy of privacy protection policies and practices in 
e-commerce” (Givens 1999). Even the FTC itself in its 2000 report on online profiling 
made a significant change. It now – to the surprise of many - said that legislation would 
be needed to complement industry initiatives like the standard proposed by the Network 
Advertising Alliance’s (NAI) and others. The most important reason given was the de-
fection problem still prevalent with most self-governance mechanisms.  
“Self-regulation cannot address recalcitrant and bad actors, new entrants to the 
market, and drop-outs from the self-regulatory program. (…) Only legislation 
can guarantee that notice and choice are always provided in the place and at the 
time consumers need them.” (FTC 2000)  
The FTC’s call was a clear sign that the official “do self-regulation, or else we regulate 
you” approach, which had been a constant pattern in the U.S., is reaching its limits. The 
Bush administration has hesitated to adopt a comprehensive data protection law for the 
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private sector. Since the attacks of 2001 it is not known as a strong supporter of privacy 
protection in general, but Congress has seen a rising number of initiatives for data pro-
tection legislation since then (Smith 2006). Several U.S. states have already moved fur-
ther and passed laws that protect data more comprehensively than current federal legis-
lation.20 In 2003, California passed the “Shine the Light” law which enables customers 
to find out how businesses sell their personal information. Since then, companies that do 
business with Californian residents have to either allow customers to opt out of informa-
tion sharing, or in detail disclose to them how their personal information is shared with 
others. The bill was a landmark because it was one of the first legislative attempts in the 
U.S. to address “list brokerage,” the compilation and sale of individuals' personal in-
formation for marketing campaigns, including spamming, telemarketing, and junk mail. 
Before that, businesses did not have to inform customers and visitors of their informa-
tion business activities, and many companies, both online and offline, sell their cus-
tomer lists to list brokers (EPIC 2005a).  
The persistence of consumer distrust in corporate privacy self-governance as well as 
the growing burden of having to comply with a number of different national and state-
level privacy laws recently has led some large corporations in the information sector to 
rethink the need of state-based governance of privacy. In a widely perceived move, in 
November 2005 Microsoft called for a comprehensive privacy law in the United States 
(Smith 2005)21. The same call was repeated in June 2006 by an industry consortium 
including Microsoft, Oracle, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, Google and other big players in the 
information technology field (Consumer Privacy Legislative Forum 2006). 
CONCLUSION: THE COMPLEX NETWORK OF PRIVACY GOVERNANCE 
The role of the state in a different shape 
We have seen that even in private sector self-regulation, there is a growing interest in 
getting the state “back in”, while on the other hand the failures of pure private sector 
regulation have created a rising public demand for more state control and enforcement. 
Be it public funding and promotion for privacy-enhancing technologies, government 
oversight over private seal mechanisms, officially certified auditing of privacy policies, 
or the recent U.S. developments in favour of private sector regulation mandated by law, 
the state is getting a more prominent role than it used to have – especially if we consider 
the “hands-off” approach towards the Internet that was prevalent ten years ago. 
What is different, though, from the state-centric approach to privacy and data protec-
tion regulation of the first generations, is a more prominent role for intermediaries. The 
                                                 
20  See <http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/states.html> for an older, but very comprehensive overview. 
21  The author is Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of Microsoft. 
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state does not regulate big databases and computer centres directly as in the 1970s and 
1980s. This would be unfeasible at least since the rise of the Internet. Instead, the state 
is now trying to control or steer what the important agents set as standards and proce-
dures. The public governance of privacy is not pursued directly anymore, but through 
private intermediaries (Perritt 1997). These are:  
¾ trade associations that get their privacy codes of conduct sealed;  
¾ technology companies like Microsoft who develop identity-management infra-
structures; 
¾ standards organisations like the World Wide Web Consortium (for the P3P 
web privacy standard); 
¾ consortiums that develop new infrastructural designs under an explicit mandate 
of the state, like the EU’s funding for the “Privacy and Identity” projects or the 
P3P development; 
¾ organisations that develop model contracts for transborder data flows between 
private parties like the ICC.  
This all is happening in the “shadow of the law” (in the United States) or even within a 
legal framework (in other OECD countries), and with an important part still being pri-
vate sector self-governance. The agents and tools of data protection regulation are there-
fore diverse, with an again growing role for the state. The distributed nature of this new 
regulatory pattern shows the new role of the state, which is more an “enabler” than an 
“enforcer” and has to work with all kinds of other agents - sometimes cooperating, 
sometimes enforcing, and sometimes enabling. This convergence of the EU and U.S. 
patterns of privacy regulation (and with other regions following) is one striking result of 
the globalisation of personal data flows through the Internet. The states in general are 
not willing anymore to tolerate every use of personal data in the online environment. 
The growing problem of “spam” (unsolicited email) is adding to this. It has already 
been subject of UN discussions, and even under the lax CAN-SPAM act of 200322, there 
have been the first large court cases against spammers in the U.S.23 The Safe Harbor 
agreement of 2000 embodies the paradigmatic convergence between the self-
governance and law-based approaches. It is still based on public law and an intergov-
ernmental agreement, but it leaves the certification and operation of privacy-governance 
to the private sector. It has also limited the scope of privacy adequacy ratings from 
                                                 
22  The full title is „Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003”, Public Law 
108-187. Critics say the “CAN” refers not to canning the spam but allowing it, as only fraudulent emails and a 
lack of opt-out information is considered a breach of the law. See EPIC (2005b) for an overview. 
23  In April 2005, the first spammer was sentenced to nine years in prison; see Der Spiegel, 18 April 2005 at 73: ‘Sie 
haben Post!’ 
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whole countries to individual companies. By doing this, it allowed for a transnational 
trading up of protection levels with potentially global reach. 
At first sight, this resembles the trading up effect of Californian rules for car emis-
sions (Vogel 1995): If you are able to change the privacy policy of a big corporation in 
one jurisdiction, you will help spread this standard worldwide. There is certainly some 
truth in this, as the example of Microsoft’s Passport project has shown. But car manu-
facturing is based on economies of scale. These are different in the computer world. It 
certainly makes sense to have one version of a new Microsoft operating system on 
global sale, but if you maintain only a few localised websites and your business model 
basically rests on one huge customer database, then it is much easier to re-programme it 
so you can distinguish between the use of personal data of EU and U.S. citizens. The 
external effects of specific privacy regulations are therefore much more effective if they 
explicitly focus on extraterritorial and third-party effects, as the 1995 EU directive did, 
and they are more effective if based on law rather than voluntary compliance. 
The trading up-effect through transnational business networks is still in place, too. It 
works more through the interoperability of standards and the reduction in transaction 
costs they provide. These standards can be technical codes like P3P or social codes such 
as standard contract clauses or a privacy management standard. They will produce a 
learning effect (if I use this standard here, I know how to use it there), and they also 
produce a network effect (if everybody else uses this standard, it is much easier for me 
if I also use it). The critical mass to generate these network effects can be generated by a 
critical mass of state and corporate users, or by a critical mass of states that mandate the 
use of privacy codes for corporate users. 
The role of social and technical codes 
The distinct technical nature of the Internet allows for other means of regulating behav-
iour than social or legal norms and rules. Lex Informatica, the ex-ante enforcement of 
specific behaviour in online environments, can certainly be a strong regulator of citi-
zens’ and corporate use of personal data. The way websites and servers are programmed 
can force users to reveal their personal data or else be locked out of a service – or it can 
free them from these obligations. Political discussions of the technical design of new 
infrastructures have certainly become more popular in recent years, with data protection 
agencies and parliaments trying to enforce more user and customer-friendly systems 
design.  
A growing nuisance for companies as well as privacy advocates has been that there is 
now a wide variety of national, sectoral and international privacy laws, codes, standards 
and commitments. Although they are more or less based on the same privacy principles, 
they have different levels of protection, different compliance and public oversight 
mechanisms, and different degrees of control by the users and customers over their data. 
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Because they work under conditions of global transnational communications, they can-
not neatly be separated along territorial borders or industry sectors anymore. In a global 
cyberspace, where proximity and distance in the classical territorial sense have van-
ished, re-zoning the Internet into separate national or organisational sub-nets has so far 
not been possible, and it is certainly something most users, companies and developers 
would oppose anyway.24 In a way, this is the return of the “conflict of law” problem, 
this time for transnational self-governance. Reidenberg’s (2000: 1358) hope that “mul-
tiple technical standards can coexist for information flows in cyberspace” - which would 
reflect the multiple regulatory approaches - has failed to materialise so far. Applying 
and translating the several national, international, and private sector privacy governance 
instruments into technical protocols that automatically manage compliance across dif-
ferent jurisdictions and organisations - and then even giving users some choice - has yet 
been too complex a task to find workable applications and convenient wide-spread use. 
We will therefore for some more time be witnessing a global privacy regime that is di-
verse, overlapping, and contradictory. Until truly global privacy norms and standards 
have emerged, the second-to-best model is therefore the “adequacy” rating method, 
which will increasingly be applied to social and technical codes alike. 
The attempts of governments and the European Union to push technological regula-
tion schemes can have a harmonising effect, and they might bring a wider use of pri-
vacy-enhancing technologies. As most of the developments described in this paper are 
very recent, it is too early to judge their effectiveness. Especially approaches like pri-
vacy impact assessments in the early stages of systems development or the EU’s re-
search funding for privacy enhancing technologies will only play out in the mid-term. 
But their widespread adoption will only happen if there is a global agreement on the 
content of the technical rules, on the level of privacy protection that is wanted. The seed 
crystals for such a global privacy standard are slowly emerging as the result of regional 
mandatory laws like the EU data protection directive, their third-party effects which 
have a globalising impact, the development of privacy standards schemes and global 
sectoral codes of conduct, the political influence on the design of large technical infra-
structures, and the private transnational contracts that reference standards and codes of 
conduct. Technical codes can help enforcement and are a new kind of binding regula-
tion for computer-mediated social interaction spaces. But their widespread adoption still 
depends on a political consensus that defines the material content of the Lex Infor-
                                                 
24  This will only be possible if the underlying Internet addresses (IP numbers and domain names) are re-zoned 
according to national boundaries. Even for countries that have established border gateways for Internet traffic like 
the proverbial “Great Firewall of China”, circumvention has been a constant nuisance. For a different view, see 
Goldsmith/Wu (2006). 
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matica. Social codes in the end still reflect social values and norms, and as long as there 
are different opinions on them, we will not see globally harmonised privacy protection. 
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